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John Leslie (1766–1832) was elected to the Chair of Mathematics at Edinburgh in
1805. A native of Largo, north of Edinburgh, he was well-qualified for the position,
and well-connected. He had published an acclaimed treatise on heat the previous year,
was a former tutor to the Wedgwoods and to a nephew of Adam Smith, and was
supported by Joseph Banks, among other scientific luminaries.
Unfortunately for Leslie, however, his unsuccessful rival for the Chair had been
backed by a group of Edinburgh clerics, members of the moderate wing of the Scottish
church. They sought to have his election overturned, invoking a clause in the
University’s statutes requiring the electors to take the advice of the Edinburgh clergy.
As evidence of Leslie’s unsuitability for the job, they cited this footnote from his 1804
treatise on heat, in which he refers approvingly to Hume’s view of causation:
Mr Hume is the first, so far as I know, who has treated of causation in a truly
philosophic manner. His Essay on Necessary Connexion  seems a model of clear and
accurate reasoning. But it was only wanted to dispel the cloud of mystery which had
so long darkened that important subject. The unsophisticated sentiments of mankind
are in perfect unison with the deductions of logic, and imply nothing more at bottom
in the relation of cause and effect, than a constant invariable sequence.
Leslie’s opponents objected that this view of causation challenges traditional arguments
for the existence of god: “Mr Leslie, having, with Mr Hume, denied all such necessary
connexion between cause and effect, … has, of course, laid a foundation for rejecting
all argument that is derived from the works of God, to prove either his being or
attributes.”
Mr Hume had had his own troubles with the University’s electors, of course.
Sixty years earlier he’d been turned down for the Chair of Moral and Pneumatical
Philosophy (the latter speciality concerned souls, not gases), on grounds of his anti-
religious views. Leslie now found himself charged with guilt by association.
In response, he quickly distanced himself from Hume on religious matters.
Moreover, he complained, “it is painful to be called on, after the habits of intimacy in
which I have lived with the most exemplary characters in both parts of the island, to
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repel a direct charge of atheism.”1 It is doubtful whether intimacy with exemplary
characters would have saved Leslie’s job, however, if church politics hadn’t come to his
aid. The pious wing of the Scottish church—keen to appear liberal, apparently, and
disliking Leslie’s clerical opponents more than they disliked his own views—came to
his defence. They supported Leslie at the church synod, and the move to challenge his
election was defeated narrowly, after a two-day debate.
How much has changed since 1805? In one sense, obviously, a great deal. In
Scotland and similarly fortunate nations, it is easier to imagine a scientific appointment
being challenged on the grounds that there is too much rather than too little religion in
evidence in the candidate’s academic work. Whatever scientists do in their spare time,
religion has been almost entirely banished from the main game. It would be nice to
report that Leslie’s implied contrast between atheism and exemplary character was also
a relic of another world, but this is much more doubtful. Still, some victories for the
Hume side, these past two centuries.
Within philosophy, however, there has been less progress, as the work of the
present John Leslie illustrates. This John Leslie is a Canadian philosopher, known for
interesting work on so-called anthropic arguments in contemporary cosmology
(arguments which try to derive novel conclusions about the nature of the universe from
the fact that it contains observers like us). But his recent book Infinite Minds: A
Philosophical Cosmology is as much a theological as a philosophical or scientific work. It
begins with the traditional problem of evil: how can we account for the existence of
pain and suffering, in a world supposedly created by a benevolent god? And it ends
with a popular modern version of the argument from design. Leslie maintains that
there is evidence for an intelligent creator in the ‘fine-tuning’ of various physical
constants apparently needed to produce a universe suitable for life.
What lies between these arguments is not Christian theology in any strict
sense—Leslie is no mere monotheist, for one thing—but it is certainly theology. Leslie
proposes that to exist is to be thought by a divine or infinite mind, of which there are
probably an infinite number. Such minds think everything worth thinking, which
includes some pain and suffering. As to why such divine minds themselves exist, Leslie
suggests that it is a kind of platonic moral requirement that they do so. Goodness has
creative force.
For me, as a resolutely secular philosopher of science, the task of reviewing the
book thus presented a practical dilemma. In one sense, it would have been easy enough
to play the game that philosophers play, engaging with Leslie’s arguments as atheist to
his theist. But to do that full-voice, as my considered response to the book, seemed a
                                                
1 Here even the implied link between theism and good character distances Leslie from Hume. On his
deathbed, Hume shocked Boswell by remarking that “when he heard a man was religious, he concluded he
was a rascal, though he had known some instances of very good men being religious.”
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kind of bad faith. It would have been a concession of intellectual respectability to a
viewpoint I regard as off the map of serious philosophical and scientific enquiry, as well
as positively harmful in its less theoretical contemporary manifestations (where ‘god is
the problem’, as Salman Rushdie put it recently.)
Put aside, for now, the issue about the harm caused by religion in
contemporary life. The remaining concern can be hard to see, easily obscured by the
fact the theological framework in question is so familiar, so ordinary, so unthreatening,
at least in its de-natured modern philosophical forms. Like almost all my professional
colleagues, after all, I grew up in a culture in which it was, and is, almost impossible for
a thoughtful child not to feel the pull of certain theological questions—“Does god
exist?”, “Does the world have a creator?”, and the like. The way we teach philosophy
ensures that if one of our students had somehow escaped these issues as a child, she
would certainly be subjected to them in introductory philosophy courses. There, she
would find them treated as legitimate and meaningful questions, fit topics on which to
practice philosophical skills.
Of course, it is easy to avoid many of the more specific concerns of traditional
Christian theology. Did the serpent really speak in the Garden of Eden, for example?
(I’m told that this issue still divides certain sects of the Dutch reformed church.) But in
their big, abstract, de-natured contemporary forms—the forms in which they feature
in Leslie’s book, among other things—these issues can seem to be simply there.
But it’s easy to be misled by familiarity. The concerns in question are easily
visible if we think of analogous examples further from home, geographically,
ideologically or historically. Think of the talking snake, after all, or “creation science”.
For my part, I’m attracted by the thought of a future in which the question whether
god exists seems just as silly. I’m suspicious of the whole theological game, even in its
de-natured forms; and not impressed by the argument that these must be serious
questions, because we get undergraduates to think about them.
Hence my dilemma. While it seemed possible, even tempting, to engage with
Leslie on particular philosophical points, taking theology at face value would have
seemed a kind of moral defeat: feeding an ancient intellectual cuckoo that would be
better simply starved. The right course seemed to be to ignore its demands on my
attention, and walk away.
How then to write about the book? Could I perhaps say something about why,
in my view, we should regard Leslie’s approach as off the intellectual map—why we
should walk away from theological debate? Or does it all come down to intellectual
fashion, to the fact that I’m simply cooler than Leslie, an earlier adopter of a discourse
in which theology has ceased to matter?
Thinking about these questions in Edinburgh, I thought of Hume (a true early
adopter) as the obvious source of what needed to be said. In Hume, in fact, we can
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find at least two versions of what might be said, one ultimately more durable than the
other. As I’ll explain, the second and more durable version turns out to have particular
relevance to Leslie’s project. We can also find in Hume a characteristically forceful
opinion about why the issue matters—more on that later.
The first possibility is that we dismiss theology on the grounds that it is simply
meaningless, according to some acceptable criterion for distinguishing sense from
nonsense, in matters academic. This idea has its heyday in the mid-twentieth century,
but is often thought to originate in Hume. Hume appears to say that on the side of
sense lies logical and mathematical reasoning, and empirical investigation. All
else—much traditional metaphysics, as well as theology—is meaningless babble. In a
famous passage from An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume describes
the practical application of this criterion:
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make?
If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let
us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?  No. Does it
contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?  No. Commit
it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Two things happened to this passage in the mid-twentieth century. First, the
allusion to book-burning acquired new and terrifying associations. (For Hume’s
original readers, it seems to have been a safely distant classical reference to the sacking
of the library at Alexandria.) Second, and more important for our present purposes, the
idea that no factual statement was meaningful unless its significance could be cashed
out in observational terms fell out of favour in philosophy, after a period of
unprecedented popularity. Under the label ‘verificationism’, this doctrine was a
centrepiece of logical positivism, a scientifically-minded philosophy which flourished in
Vienna between the wars. (Its leading English-speaking proponent was A J Ayer.)
Logical positivism marked a kind of high tide for empiricism in philosophy, and the
demise of verificationism was but one aspect of a wide-ranging (and on-going)
reassessment of empiricism, in post-war Anglo-American philosophy.
True, verificationism remains influential and useful as a kind of pocket
philosophy for practising scientists, where its effect is to focus the minds of theorists on
the question as to how their proposals might be tested. But in philosophy of science,
almost nobody thinks of the choice between scientific theories as a straightforwardly
observational matter. The choice between theories, even in science, is widely seen as a
much messier, more pragmatic matter than traditional empiricism liked to believe.
Regrettably, then, there doesn’t seem to be any simple way of distinguishing
sense from nonsense, and hence of dismissing theology on the grounds that it is
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nonsense. Theology may become meaningless to us as we walk away from it, but we
can’t rule it nonsensical in advance, as justification for walking away. If there is a
justification, it seems likely to be pragmatic. Theology must be shown to be a game it
isn’t useful to play.
But pragmatism cuts both ways. As William James had noted with approval at
the turn of the century, pragmatism may preserve a place for religion, in the face of
science. If we should believe what it is pragmatically useful to believe, and it is useful to
believe in god, then we should believe in god. In fact, James goes even further: if our
belief in god works, that makes it true. This can sound like the view that faith has
creative or ontological power, but it is important to keep in mind that pragmatism has
lowered the bar. Success makes for truth in the only sense of truth the pragmatist
allows; but it does not make for truth in the old metaphysical sense. (In The Will to
Believe James compares the self-vindicating role of faith to the benefits of resolve in
romantic endeavours: “How many women's hearts are vanquished by the mere
sanguine insistence of some man that they must love him!” His own experience seems
to have confirmed this opinion only negatively, in that he was a famously indecisive
man, and unlucky in love.)
However, the path that pragmatism thus leaves open for religion in the light of
science requires that religion be doing a different job from science. If religion is a
competitor to science, a rival strategy in the same game, the success of science implies
the (comparative) failure of religion: faith doesn’t work, compared to science. To the
extent that religion remains in the same game as science, in other words, James’s
pragmatic defence won’t save it.
This brings me to the second and more durable way of appealing to Hume, to
dismiss Leslie’s kind of theology. One of Hume’s great contributions to philosophy is
to turn the scientific spotlight on our own habits of thought—to ask the genealogical
question about how, and why, we come to talk of various things: external objects,
values, gods, causes, and so on. This gives us a way of comparing religion and science,
and the upshot, as we’ll see, is bad news for Leslie’s kind of theology.
Initially, Hume’s spotlight may seem promising for a pragmatic defence of
religious belief, based on the idea that theism is a different game from science. After
all, implicit in the genealogical question, and explicit in Hume’s answers to it, is the
recognition that the genetic story may be different in each case. Different kinds of talk
may have different origins, and do different jobs. However, everything depends on
what the genetic account of religion turns out to be—on whether it can justly claim to
be orthogonal to science.
Another of Hume’s key ideas is that we are prone to “project” our ideas and
values onto the world, and hence see it as full of seemingly objective properties that
really have their origin in us. As Hume puts it, the mind “has a productive faculty, and
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gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal
sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation.” But the upshot of this realisation differs
greatly from case to case.
On the one hand, consider theism. Hume suggests that theism originates in
primitive society when—seeking to make sense of a perilous and often unpredictable
world—our ancestors see it as peopled by intelligent agents, built in their own image.
The idea that the world has such an anthropomorphic causal structure then turns out to
be in conflict with science. Putting it crudely, science shows that the theory that causes
tend to be anthropomorphic is just a very bad theory. (Hume may also have thought
that causation itself is anthropomorphic, and in tension with science, which shows there
is nothing but regularities; but we can leave this complexity aside.)
On the other hand, consider judgements of right and wrong, good and bad.
Hume thinks that these, too, are projections of our own likes and dislikes. In that sense,
morality has no objective basis in the world. But it is not clear that appreciating this
should make us less inclined to moralise (as Nietzsche, famously, was later to
maintain). Perhaps moralising is like falling in love, in that appreciating its biological
basis need make us no less inclined to do it. (“Even logical positivists are capable of
love”, as A J Ayer put it, and—having what William James evidently lacked—managed
to confirm with some notoriety.)
Unlike much religion, at any rate, morality isn’t making causal claims about
how the world works. So it isn’t undermined by science’s discovery that the world
works some other way. Theism’s vulnerability turns on the particular job that it claims
to do—on the fact that it is bad science, in effect—not simply on its anthropocentric
origins.
This contrast between religion and morality might break down in one of two
ways. First, it is easy to imagine a religious or spiritual practice that explicitly distances
itself from the kind of causal claims that bring it into conflict with science. Even if all
religions originate as proto-science, some of them might surely mutate into something
different. The bad science objection then has no bite, and religion seems on a par with
morality, from a Humean point of view. (In practice, of course, this is a very common
way of trying to save a space for religion, in the light of science.)
Two remarks about this possibility. First, the pragmatic question remains open.
It is one thing to show that such a practice is possible, another to maintain that it is
good for us. (More on this in a moment.) Second, and more relevant to the present
context, this “religion is not science” option simply isn’t open to Leslie. Leslie’s
pantheistic picture is supposed to answer some of the big scientific questions: What is
the universe like, and why? So although the contrast between religion and morality
might break down in a way that saved religion, it can’t do so in a way that saves Leslie’s
project. (Quite the contrary, in fact, as we’re about to see.)
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I said that the contrast between religion and morality might break down in one
of two ways. The less obvious possibility, which dooms morality rather than saving
religion, is to give moral notions a role that puts them in conflict with science. But this
is what Leslie does! For Leslie, moral requirements are the ultimate explanation of the
existence of anything (including divine minds). Such things exist because there is a
moral requirement that they do so.
Given a Humean account of the genealogy of morals, this would be simply
absurd. Leslie knows this, of course, and in what for me are some of the most
disappointing passages in the book, tries to dismiss the kind of accounts of moral talk
which descend from Hume. “At this point”, Leslie says, “let us make no effort to
refute various anti-objectivist theories [of good and bad] dreamt up by philosophers.”2
Let us say simply that such theories fail to capture the ordinary senses of words such as
‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘ethically demanded’. The ordinary view is that various things are
… ‘made needful or required’, not by human likes and dislikes only … but through
their own natures. It is a view arrived at for the unmysterious reason that people like to
think they are absolutely right in favouring this or that while their benighted
opponents are absolutely wrong. (167)
The ideas of good and bad were formed by people who wanted to picture various
things they favoured as absolutely called for, so that their opponents truly were
benighted folk instead of just folk who favoured different things. (170)
Ironically, these remarks could almost be Humean explanations of how people
come to think of good and bad as objective aspects of reality (“rais[ing] in a manner a
new creation”)—and reminders of the risks of taking this too far, of thinking of our
own preferences as guides to absolute goods. For Leslie, however, the two uses of
“benighted” here must be unironic. Accordingly, these passages seem to me to display
not only a remarkable disregard for the important philosophical approach to morality
that stems from Hume, but also considerable insensitivity to the realities of deep moral
differences.
Let’s sum up. We’ve allowed that pragmatism saves a place for religion in the
face of science, but only if religion is not in the same game as science. Otherwise,
pragmatism doesn’t save it from the charge that it is simply bad science. What’s wrong
with Leslie’s project is simply that he’s offering us very bad science. And the best way
                                                
2 Here Leslie calls our attention to an earlier work in which, he says, he “goes so far as to suggest that
defending [such theories] would add to the dangers now facing humankind if anybody listened to
philosophers.”
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to see that it is bad science is to reflect in a Humean spirit on the anthropocentric
origins of its key concepts, of gods and goodness.
We’ve also noted that even when religion isn’t in the same game as science, it is
only saved by pragmatism if it turns out to be useful. So, finally, to the question I’ve
been deferring. Is religion good for us? Does it improve our lives? This is a huge issue,
of course, and an urgent one. (As Simon Schama puts it, in an article published as I was
finishing this review, on the first anniversary of September 11, “the need to break clear
from the suffocation of reverent togetherness is not just a matter of philosophical self-
respect.”) And Hume came this way, too, of course. Let’s close with his view of the
matter—his pragmatic reason for welcoming a future, sadly still to come, in which
Leslie’s project seems an absurd relic of a less enlightened age.
How happens it then, …  if vulgar superstition be so salutary to society, that all history
abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious consequences on public affairs?
Factions, civil wars, persecutions, subversions of government, oppression, slavery; these
are the dismal consequences which always attend its prevalency over the minds of
men. If the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical narration, we are sure to
meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend it. And no period of time
can be happier or more prosperous, than those in which it is never regarded or heard
of. (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, XII)
Postscript
This review was commissioned for The London Review of Books. However, it was
rejected by the commissioning editor, John Sturrock, who found it unacceptably
dismissive—a failure to take the book “seriously”, as he put it. At the time, this seemed
an unexpected confirmation of the very thing my review was attacking, viz., the
continuing respectability of Leslie’s brand of scientific theology. Apparently the subject
remained so respectable, at least in the eyes of this particular editor, that the view that it
did not deserve such a status could not be regarded as a serious response to the book.
(Mr Sturrock didn’t respond to a request that he reconsider.)
My treatment of Leslie’s project was certainly disrespectful, but of course that
was the point. Our collective view of what counts as a worthwhile intellectual
endeavour changes over time. At a certain point, when a topic nears the margins, the
view that it should be pushed beyond them begins to be taken seriously. That view is
inevitably a recommendation for disrespect—a disrespect required by self-respect,.
Theology has been moving in that direction for a long time. Eventually it will
be off the map, and even The London Review of Books will no more take seriously a
work such as Leslie’s than they would now review a defence of “creation science”, or
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astrology. Until then, it remains important to remind ourselves that we can keep
moving in that direction. At present, then, a serious intellectual response to this kind of
book is to remind ourselves that we don’t need to take it seriously, in the sense that the
editor had in mind. We don’t need to keep feeding the theological cuckoo. We are
entitled simply to walk away.3
                                                
3 Belated thanks to several people who gave me comments on this piece in 2002, including Rae Langton,
Richard Holton, Peter Kail and Jeanne Peijnenberg; and especially to John Wright, who alerted to me the
existence and tribulations of the other John Leslie.
